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Factory regimes and labour deregulation in the Spanish steel industry
In 1982, Spain's accession to the European Economic Community and its incorporation to the European social market economy came with a promise of progress: Spain's way out of 'backwardness' in political, economic and cultural terms.
Yet this promise also served as a legitimation for neoliberal policies that rolled out the privatisation of public holdings and the restructuring (reconversión) of the heavy industries (Narotzky 2016) . Neo-corporatist agreements between political parties, labour unions, and the state promised a political and economic transition which set in motion deindustrialisation without outlining an alternative policy for those whose livelihoods depended on the industrial economy (Castells et al 1994) . However, although the steel industry is no longer as central to Spain's economic development as it was under Franco's Regime 1 (Martín and Comín 1990, 1991; Benton 1990; González 2004) , steelmaking factories survive the constant threat of erasure that never actually materialises. Even after state and market led forces caused a sharp decrease in the number and quality of jobs available, steel jobs have now become precarious, and subject to new and changing global competitiveness standards.
Spain's particular combination of characteristics as a central and peripheral economy, or as a semiperiphery (Arrighi 1985) , and its particular trajectory as a European liberal democracy, partly explains the specific vulnerabilities of its workforce in the face of neoliberalisation and globalisation. Indeed, six decades after the first integrated steel factory was set up in Asturias under Franco's regime, as global multinationals operate side by side with smaller producers, the meaning of working in the steel industry is now radically transformed. As Narotzky and Goddard (2015) have shown, the heavy industries played a central role in the political configuration of Europe after the Second World War, where industrial collaboration was seen as a crucial mechanism to foster mutual dependence while increasing economic rationalisation. Also in Spain, from the 1950s on, within the public-owned holding
Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) created by the Francoist regime, steelmaking stood up as one of the main industrial activities to be fostered by the State.
In this context, differences between state-owned and private companies emerged as a defining feature of cultures of work and working-class identities in the steel sector.
Under the hegemonic factory regimes of State-owned companies, cultures of work and working class identities emerged hand in hand with the creation of company neighbourhoods around state funded factories, offering not only housing, but also leisure and social activities, and supported by strong ties around emergent labour unions and collectives of political resistance. This contrasted with the situation in private steel companies, where work cultures and identities were articulated around the most basic struggles for better working conditions. In that case, 'despotic' factory regimes framed 'the continual making, unmaking and remaking of labour forces and working classes -politically, economically and structurally -through the dual lens of dispossession and disorganization ' (Kasmir and Carbonella 2014, 5) .
A global crisis engulfed steel production in Europe from 1974, affecting steel firms with varied measures of economic liberalization, restructuring, privatization, asset destruction, offshoring, speculation and capital mobility. In order to interpret the impact of these recent and current developments on the steel industry, we take as a point of departure the distinct factory regimes described above. They reveal how the complex social relations that shape industrial change in particular localities and historical moments trump sweeping generalizations about the implications of industrial transformation (see Lee 2010 , Reygadas 2002 . As complex articulations where distinct power relations facilitate comparisons between different circumstances faced by a firm along its trajectory, or between firms in different locations or industrial sectors, factory regimes appear as a key factor shaping the experience of work. Evolving along differentiated histories of State intervention, labour and ownership relations, and newly exposed to the pressures of global competition, factory regimes continue to be an important analytic device to understand the differences through which particular, historically situated groups of workers adapt to, transform and contest abstract economic models. In a neoliberal atmosphere, and as a result of the unprecedented circulation of capital giving way to international competition for investments and global markets, the Spanish industrial workforce has been quantitatively reduced and dispossessed from many of their prior rights and entitlements In this context, labour relations offer a unique lens to reflect on changing engagements between capital and state, framing how relations among workers, between workers and social agents, as well as international entities and partnerships, underpin economic logics and differentiate and unify working and cultural identities (Ong 1987; Carrier 1992) . Indeed, as Narotzky and Goddard have noted, economic models 'become and are enacted through, the struggles are responsible agents in historically grounded practice: they are designed and settled -however fleetingly-in complex interactions between powerful and less powerful human actors ' (2015:9 (Castells 1994; Agüera 1996) , supported by the regional government of Pedro de Silva, led to the dismantling of heavy industry in pursuit of 'the new light economy' (Silva 1982 , Buznego and Silva 2009 , Montero 2002 , González-Polledo 2015 , which consisted in redefining industrial production away from the heavy industries, in relation to a fabric of medium scale, knowledge- Workers' bargaining power was neutralised as, like Burawoy predicted, they were 'forced to choose between wage cuts (...) and job loss. As a result, the fear of being fired is replaced by the fear of capital flight, plant closure, transfer of operations, and plant disinvestment ' (1985:150) . In the Galician plant, while the stability of the regular workforce did not seem endangered, fixed-term workers depending on subcontracted companies had almost disappeared from the workforce, as ACERASA's managers tried to cut down production costs and to limit the volume of outputs in order to deal with the crisis in the Spanish building industry, their main client. At this time, in both locations, the result of multiple policy and practice constraints, conditions in the industry had never been more precarious for workers -through multiple mechanisms from factory relations to the structure of European Works Councils (Gonzalez Begega 2011) , and state deregulation of Multi National
Corporations (Gonzalez Begega and Kohler 2010) . But this precarisation did not deactivate, as our comparative ethnography highlights, the ability of work cultures As funding for the apprentices school ran out, professional training began to be carried out in underequipped state-funded centres, while specialised forms of in-house training aimed to provide on the job training 6 .
Although it is now long gone, SIDERSA's apprentices school and the culture of craftsmanship it promoted still resonated with the collective imagination of work among the steelworkers who had attended it (and those who for many reasons could not). Especially around company neighbourhoods created under Franco's project of industrial paternalism and still home to many (former) industrial workers, the School epitomised a lost ideal of the industrial worker, which many thought policy makers should return to in order to solve some of the industry's problems. As the remaining workers of the first generation retired, supported by pension schemes 7 , their historic expertise and traditional craftsmanship left with them, leaving a void of knowledge and skills. Further, the Apprenticeship School provided a model of working class identity (see Thompson 1989) . For the second generation steel workers we interviewed, who were approaching retirement, the evolution of the School epitomised the intersection of their working class identities and their working lives.
The apprenticeship school was not only a class institution. They stressed that through the training they were able to access the security associated with working in happened on a contract basis agreed with company union branches. Rather than equalising access and providing more training, this system meant union branches and employers' associations were equally responsible for training provision, but the decreasing availability of public funds made it harder for unions to cope with deskilling.
The 'skill gap' created new divisions between a dwindling number of permanent staff and increased numbers of contract workers in the 1990s (Kohler et al 2007) . The latter, employed by outsourced companies (around 3000 at the time of our fieldwork), used the same premises and shared workloads with their in-house counterparts, working on services such as maintenance and cleaning. However, contract workers did not have access to safety uniforms and equipment, had to work unpredictable shifts, and were routinely subject to hiring and firing practices as service contracts were replaced, though their jobs were guaranteed in labour agreements between their union and the company 8 . Although outsourcing practices increased during the 1990s and early 2000s, in the past ten years SIDERSA has been moving towards internalising contract workers to maintain quality and training standards, a move seen to provide long-term cost-effectiveness through labour flexibility. Herme had spent twenty years at the factory working on maintenance of the hot strip mill, and had accrued 'around 400' short term contracts during this time. He summarised the differences between his work and that of company workers:
As a contract worker you do a bit of everything. If you were a company worker, you could stop doing a job if you feel the job should be completed by another colleague. But as a contract worker, I have to manage to finish every job. You have to use all tools. As a company worker, you may have a specialism, but that is not respected when you are a contract worker (Herme, contract worker and Contract Workers' Union Organiser)
As the workforce was laid off through early retirement plans and more production services were sold or outsourced, jobs in the steel industry became scarce, precarious and more competitive. Jobs at the factory involved greater technological expertise which was no longer covered in public training programmes.
With these changes, the workers' movement was also significantly transformed.
Unionised SIDERSA workers highlight the bottom-up character of union organising in the early days and the unions' engagement with wider struggles for social change, which was lost during the long restructuring period. UGT, CCOO and USO unions split over labour reforms, and bottom-up, direct action strategies were progressively abandoned in favour of bargaining at plant level. Our interviewees confirm expert claims that the unions' bargaining strategies became conciliatory after this point 9 .
Many linked the neoliberal transformation with the political processes of democratic The union's local bargaining power progressively diminished. As neoliberal policies had an effect on industrial relations, its role was reduced to negotiating compliance with company labour adjustment plans. At the heart of the multinational, social agents have listening power under European directives, but no decision-making capacity (Kohler et al. 2006; González Begega 2011) .
Ultimately, the Spanish state's continuing failure to implement a successful reindustrialisation policy (Castells 1994) , and the inadequate participation of social agents in the new economy (Miranda et al 1994) , have contributed to the long-term decline of industrial production in Asturias (Kohler 1996; González 2004; García Blanco 1998) 10 . Yet workers we interviewed expressed a conviction that, despite threats of closure, relocation and downsizing regularly used to discipline the workforce, local expertise remained central to competitive advantage, and thus continuing demand levels for high quality steel products would ensure continuing steel production in Asturias.
Workers' identities, labour politics and livelihood strategies around a nonintegrated steel plant
In the small town where ACERASA is located, there is a strong identification with The steel plant is out of step with these local representations of history. In particular, steel workers are seen -and to a great extent see themselves-as not having made a significant contribution to the political resistance that emerged from the shipyards in the 1960s, which involved wide sectors of the local working class. Throughout the 1970s, the workforce in ACERASA was not strongly organized nor connected to the local labour leadership on a consistent basis. As mentioned, workers at the steel plant came from a rural background, had no previous experience of industry or labour organizations, and were politically weakened by the patron-client ties that linked them to the owners' family:
"Workers in other factories did not take them into account. There wasn't a consciousness like in steelmaking in Asturias, or here in the shipyards (...).
They were people who had learnt directly on the shop floor, very little trained and with no formal education […] . It was merely a struggle for survival and for a wage at the end of each month. The situation was so distressing that they had to struggle. They knew nothing" (XCF, priest).
Only on two occasions the isolation from trade unions was partially overcome, prompted by unbearable working conditions 13 . But it was not until the first two decades of democratic government, when industrial restructuring dramatically affected the region and the political role of trade unions faced a serious crisis, that the representatives of ACERASA workers became involved in internal struggles. A number of improvements in working conditions, especially in relation to pay, were achieved in those years. Thereafter, labour representatives pursued their activity at grassroots level and did not covet the privileges that could have led them to an 'embourgeoisement', which their comrades in the shipbuilding sector have been accused of. It could also be the case that, given their relative isolation from union bureaucracies and the intricacy of capital-labour relations in a family-owned company where personal bonds play an important role, the plant's labour representatives would have never had actual access to such privileges. It is a widespread opinion among our participants that ACERASA's union leaders have faced the new century without losing their connection with the workers' everyday concerns 14 . As a non-unionised worker put it, "I feel well represented by the workers' committee because they are workmates, and therefore they want what is best for us, just the same as me. If they were outsiders, they would not care. I could be a member of the committee, because they want for them the same as I want for me. The problem is that this company is so reluctant to negotiate... [...] . But I am sure they do all they can, if they could do more, they would do more" (R, worker).
continues to be managed in a rather authoritarian manner -a 'dictatorial' one, according to some participants-and working conditions beyond economic issueswhat our participants called 'social' conditions, such as the adverse environment of the plant or the organization of shift work-are unsatisfying for many. These circumstances, however, are felt to be compensated -at least partially-by the reasonable pay and the stability afforded by ACERASA jobs. As workers concede, their total wages -including productivity bonuses and other incentives-are fairly attractive within the region. After management decided not to renew temporary work contracts and to pursue production without the intervention of auxiliary companies, all workers in ACERASA are on permanent contracts. This is indeed an exceptional situation both in the wider context of the Spanish job market and in relation to a local industrial workforce that, since restructuring, tends to be hired through temporary contracts by auxiliary companies. But steelworkers stress that these 'privileges' are attained at a price. In addition to the physical risk and harshness of steel-making work, the management imposes a strict work discipline on the staff, divisions are enforced in order to prevent the development of horizontal relations between different professional groups, and few opportunities for workplace comfort or workers' selfexpression are offered. Moreover, there is little recognition of workers' needs and responsibilities outside of work, for example relating the reconciliation of production and reproduction. The latter has led to a latent conflict that places a considerable burden on domestic arrangements, an issue that is faced in particular by younger generations of workers, whose wives tend to work outside the home, and thus who do not fit the model of the breadwinner, as was the case for their older workmates (Sabaté 2017) .
The combination of these circumstances has an adverse impact on the staff's experience of work and on wider social organization. As a result, while employment stability and reasonable wages continue to be perceived as an opportunity to settle down and to start a family, steelworkers feel excluded from the perceived advantages 
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